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ABSTRACT
This Article identifies the drastic differences in implementation
and enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention norms.
Since its adoption and entry into force in 1999, the international
community and parties to the Convention still struggle with
combatting foreign bribery. The United States is a leader in
implementation through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but
other nations do not have similar domestic statutes and rigor in
enforcement or adequate administrative structures for mutual legal
assistance or penalties. This Article provides an introduction to the
United States and International efforts to curb acts of bribery,
provides an overview of the norms and mechanisms for
enforcement under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and then
analyzes the actual progress of selected G20 nations by examining
the most recent Phase 3 peer-review reports and any follow-up
recommendations. This data indicates that there are countries with
high enforcement, moderate enforcement, and little or no
enforcement. To better discourage foreign bribery in the future,
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OECD countries should provide more uniform and longer domestic
statute of limitations, clear implementing legislation like the FCPA
in the United States, national procedures for investigating bribery
and coordinating administrative bodies, whistleblower protection,
and more severe national penalties and confiscation of bribery
funds. This will capture the spirit of the Convention and pave the
way for more uniformity in deterring foreign bribery.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/4

2019]

International Anti-Bribery Norms and Enforcement
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction ......................................................................... 468
2. Overview of U.S. and International Efforts to Curb Bribery
......................................................................................... 469
3. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: An Overview of the
Norms and Mechanisms for Their Enforcement ......... 474
4. An Analysis of OECD Enforcement After Phase 3 Review
......................................................................................... 477
4.1. Examples of High Enforcement: Germany, Italy, South
Korea, and United States........................................... 479
4.1.1. Germany ........................................................ 479
4.1.2. Italy ............................................................... 480
4.1.3. South Korea.................................................... 482
4.1.4. United States.................................................. 484
4.2. Examples of Moderate Enforcement: Australia, Canada,
France, Japan, and the United Kingdom .................... 485
4.2.1. Australia ........................................................ 485
4.2.2. Canada ........................................................... 487
4.2.3. France ............................................................ 488
4.2.4. Japan .............................................................. 490
4.2.5. United Kingdom............................................. 492
4.3. Countries with Limited Enforcement: Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Russia, and Turkey ...................................... 495
4.3.1. Argentina ....................................................... 495
4.3.2. Brazil ............................................................. 497
4.3.3. Mexico ........................................................... 498
4.3.4. Russia ............................................................ 499
4.3.5. Turkey............................................................ 501
5. Observations Regarding the Lack of Adequate Anti-Bribery
Enforcement Demonstrated in the Recent OECD Phase 3
and Follow up Reports .................................................. 503
5.1. Increased Length of Statute of Limitations................. 504
5.2. Existence of Whistleblower Protection in Statutes ..... 504
5.3. Formal Adoptions of Implementing Legislation and
National Anti-Bribery Laws...................................... 505
5.4. Clarity of Enforcement Mechanism(s) and National
Procedure.................................................................. 505
5.5. Equality in Severity of National Penalties ................. 506
6. Conclusion: Towards Uniformity with FCPA-Modeled
Implementing Legislation as a Model for OECD AntiBribery Convention Norms and Enforcement ............. 507

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

467

468

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:2

1. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 is the premier statute
in the United States to address the nefarious conduct of foreign
corrupt payments to foreign officials, foreign political parties, or
candidates for political office in order to influence any act of that
foreign official and to secure any improper advantage in order to
obtain business.1 Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act
is divided between the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for civil and
criminal authority over all covered persons under the Act, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) for civil and
administrative authority over all issuers.2 Historically, the United
States has been a beacon for enforcement of foreign corrupt
payments within the international community.3 In December 1997,
twenty-eight out of twenty-nine countries who were members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(“OECD”) signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions (the “Anti-Bribery Convention”). These
signatories included the United States, and this international
convention reflected the hard work of the United States while
championing the draft of international legal standards for foreign
bribery.4 All of the nations that ratified the OECD Convention have
been complying with the Anti-Bribery Convention by enacting
domestic legislation that prohibits transnational bribery.5 The
United States enacted the changes to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act in 1998 to align with the broader OECD standards of proscribing
payments to secure an “improper advantage” and expanded the
jurisdictional scope of the Act to apply to foreign persons.6 Yet, since
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et. seq.
See id. at § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (“An officer or employee of a foreign government
or any instrumentality will qualify as a foreign official”).
3 See, e.g., MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA
1–45 (2014) (providing a history of and rationale for the FCPA).
4 See Id.
5 See Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdantibriberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/H6C2-UJJJ] (listing the four phases of its
peer-review monitoring system).
6
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, § 2, 112 Stat. 3302 (modifying 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(A), 78dd-2(a)(1)(A),
78dd-3(a)(1)(A)).
1
2

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/4

2019]

International Anti-Bribery Norms and Enforcement

469

the OECD Convention was signed and implemented by various
parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention, there have been varying
success stories with domestic enforcement. For example, a weak
legal system in an OECD nation and subpar domestic legal
enforcement mechanisms may lead to few sanctions or domestic
review of these economic crimes in the international business
market.
This Article will first analyze the goals and mandates of the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions since its entry
into force in 1999. Then, it will analyze the relative dearth of
enforcement or settlements for bribery violations by some OECD
countries who have ratified the Convention as juxtaposed to the
more vigorous prosecutions and penalties in other OECD countries.
More specifically, the Article will highlight OECD nations that are
falling behind in anti-bribery efforts according to the recent OECD
Working Group’s reports (“Phase 3” OECD reports7). Third, the
Article will provide analysis of case studies of several nations that
are meeting or exceeding their OECD anti-corruption obligations as
a normative standard. Finally, the Article will conclude with a
proposal for increased international cooperation and mutual legal
assistance to align with OECD goals and international anti-bribery
norms while also recognizing the United States as a leader in
enforcement and prosecutions. This proposal will also consider the
need for uniformity in OECD implementation and its associated
anti-bribery norms on a global scale as an aspiration for
international business dealings in a global economy.
2. OVERVIEW OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CURB
BRIBERY
International corruption has historically existed in a variety of
forms. Nations, both through their public officials and business
7 See Country reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdantibriberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/M95C-ACM6] (providing access to
individual countries’ monitoring reports and the 2017-18 timetable for peer reviews
and follow-up reports).
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traditions or governmental entities, often facilitate corrupt actions
by foreigners. Unscrupulous business incentives have often been
used to encourage companies to seek out business and trade in
foreign nations in lieu of favoring more legitimate business
developments or international business transactions in their own
Today’s global business corruption affects the
jurisdiction.8
international marketplace and creates an opening for crimes of
many kinds that weaken the international business terrain.9 These
nefarious effects include criminal networks for narcotics, terrorism,
human traffickers, cybercrimes, and many other globally harmful
acts.10
The United States spearheaded the international anti-corruption
movement after the Watergate scandal put international corruption
in the spotlight in the 1970s.11 Until the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (“FCPA”) passed in 1977, after illegal payments to foreign
officials were uncovered, the United States had not adequately
addressed foreign corrupt practices in the context of extraterritorial
business.12 The Watergate scandal uncovered a myriad of bribery

8 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Fight against Corruption, MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUB.
INT’L
L.
(Sept.
2009),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e918 [https://perma.cc/8VNK-C2WV] (identifying various illicit
business practices that encourage companies to engage in business transactions in
foreign jurisdictions). See also generally KOEHLER, supra note 3.
9 See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: WAYS TO ENHANCE
THE WORLD BANK’S (2006) (noting that foreign corruption undermines the
international marketplace). See also generally Roger P. Alford, A Broken Windows
Theory of International Corruption, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1253 (2012) (arguing that
international corruption signals the breakdown of the necessary community
controls for general welfare).
10 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (TI), EXPORTING CORRUPTION, PROGRESS
REPORT 2015: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATTING
FOREIGN BRIBERY (2015) (reporting that foreign corruption has diverse and farreaching consequences). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assistant
Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell Delivers Remarks Highlighting Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement at the George Washington University Law
School (Nov. 3, 2016) (asserting that foreign corruption “is far more harmful than
can be measured numerically” due to its wide-ranging consequences).
11
Abiola O. Makinwa, Researching Civil Remedies for International Corruption:
The Choice of the Functional Comparative Method, 2 ERASMUS L. REV. 331, 332 (2009)
(“[T]he Watergates scandal in the United States led to the passage of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).”) (citation omitted).
12 See KOEHLER, supra note 3, at 1–19.
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payments by U.S. businesses to foreign public officials.13 In
historically uncharted territory, the United States addressed the
illegal, including criminal, activities that businesses should not
undertake when conducting international business in other
nations.14 Few prosecutions ensued from the FCPA in its early years
because the anti-bribery statutory language was unclear to the DOJ
and SEC in the 1980s and 1990s.15 The 1998 amendments to the
FCPA implemented the treaty obligations of the OECD’s AntiBribery Convention.16 With this 1998 revision, the DOJ and SEC
then began to more vigorously prosecute FCPA violations for
facilitating procurement of business deals in foreign jurisdictions
through bribes or other payments to public officials.17
Since 1998, the DOJ has increased prosecution of FCPA
violations, making the United States the leader in foreign corrupt
practices enforcement.18 Two recent cases highlight this recent vigor
in prosecution, which often leads to settlement. During the WalMart scandal in Mexico in 2011 involving illegal payments made to
facilitate store openings in the country, the DOJ was at the forefront
of foreign corrupt practices exposure because a major U.S. corporate
entity revealed bribery violations in conjunction with foreign
business expansion.19 After investigating Wal-Mart’s business
See Id.
See Id.
15 See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action:
Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285 (2007) (identifying
recent controversial FCPA cases and discussing particular FCPA provisions).
16
S. REP. NO. 105-277 (1998). See also Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 19, 1997, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 1 (establishing legally binding standards to
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions).
17
These are mainly bribery cases under Section 78dd-2 of the FCPA. See FCPA
Related
Enforcement
Actions,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/related-enforcement-actions
[https://perma.cc/PS6N-X8MU] (listing enforcement actions from 1977 to
present); Department of Justice, Opinion Releases Index, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/opinion-releases-index
[https://perma.cc/27FP-SQNA] (listing released FCPA opinions from 1980-2014).
18 See generally KOEHLER, supra note 3, at 169–233.
19 See generally Miguel Bustillo & Joe Palazzolo, Wal-Mart Discloses a Corruption
Probe,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
9,
2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203501304577086933145615936
[https://perma.cc/QN75-CSV6] .
13
14
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practices in several countries including the original location of new
Wal-Mart stores in Mexico, a settlement was reached in 2016 for at
least USD 600 million.20 And, in January 2017, Rolls-Royce admitted
to the DOJ that it bribed government officials in several countries in
exchange for government contracts in violation of the FCPA, leading
to a USD 170 million settlement.21 Rolls-Royce also agreed to a
cumulative USD 800 million global settlement with U.S., UK, and
Brazilian authorities.22 Between 2000 and 2013, Rolls-Royce paid
more than USD 35 million in bribes to foreign officials through third
parties.23 The Rolls Royce and Wal-Mart settlements are prime
examples of the DOJ’s integral role of leading international antibribery enforcements mechanisms under the FCPA since the 1998
revisions to the Act.
Outside the United States and the FCPA enforcement actions,
there have also been concerted efforts to curb bribery on a global
scale by other G20 nations. The main international business treaty
that governs international anti-bribery is the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention.24 Over thirty-five nations are parties to the OECD AntiBribery Convention terms, which reveals substantial agreement in
the international community toward combatting bribery since the
Anti-Bribery Convention’s signature in 1997 and entry into force in
1999.25 The parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention include many of
the G20 nations where corruption still persists in international
20
Tom Schoenberg & Matt Robinson, Wal-Mart Balks at Paying $600-MillionNEWS
(Oct.
6,
2016),
Plus
in
Bribery
Case,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/wal-mart-said-to-balkat-paying-600-million-plus-in-bribe-case [https://perma.cc/BH7S-GTRM].
21
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Rolls-Royce Agrees to Pay $170 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rolls-royce-plc-agrees-pay-170-millioncriminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [https://perma.cc/P8VWJWS2]. See also Tom Schoenberg & Matt Robinson, supra note 20 (reporting the same
figure).
22
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 21.
23 Id.
24 See Country reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
supra note 7 (listing parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and reports from
each country on implementation efforts).
25 See, e.g., Data on enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/data-on-enforcement-of-the-antibribery-convention.htm [https://perma.cc/587Y-8WV3] (summarizing worldwide
enforcement actions under the Anti-Bribery Convention).
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business dealings based on inconsistent measures to implement the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention into national legal landscapes and
business climates.26 Numerous international business partners of
the United States, though, are falling behind in the fight against
international foreign corrupt business practices based on the current
lack of prosecutions and domestic implementation of the OECD
norms, especially when juxtaposed against the U.S. vigor.27
According to an Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Criminal
Division, “corruption is far more harmful than can be measured
numerically . . . when corruption takes hold, the fundamental notion
of playing by the rules gets pushed to the side, and individuals,
businesses and governments instead begin to operate under a
fundamentally unfair—and destabilizing—set of norms.”28 The
Assistant Attorney General explained that international business
corruption undermines confidence in the international markets and
governments and “destroys the sense of fair play.”29 The harm to
the international business “fair play” norms is significant as the
World Bank estimates that more than USD 1 trillion is paid each year
in bribes, amounting to approximately three percent of the world’s
economy.30
Anti-corruption, including anti-bribery efforts, is also generally
available on an international scale with the entry into force of the

26 See, e.g., OECD, OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS (2014) (revealing that foreign bribery persists in
some of the G20 nations, such as Argentina, France, and Japan, because of the
prevalence of payments to facilitate public procurement of contracts in foreign
jurisdictions where this practice is the cultural norm).
27 See generally OECD, 2015 DATA ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION (Nov. 2016) (showing that a majority of parties to the Anti-Bribery
Convention have not sanctioned a single party since the treaty came into effect).
28
Dep’t of Justice, supra note 21.
29 Id.
30 Issue Paper on Corruption and Economic Growth 5 (2013), OECD,
https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/Issue-Paper-Corruptionand-Economic-Growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T6A-4WDL] (“A widely quoted
estimate by the World Bank(2013) [sic] puts the total amount of bribes paid in both
developing and developed countries in 2001/2002 at 1 trillion dollars, about 3 % of
world GDP at the time.”). See also OECD, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MEASURING OECD RESPONSES (2014) (discussing progress in
halting illicit financial flows and shortcomings of OECD nations in dealing with
illicit flows).

OF
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United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005.31 This is a
treaty involving many G20 nations who are attempting to combat
global corruption. With 140 signatories and over 180 parties to this
United Nations (“UN”) agreement, the UN Convention provides for
increased cooperation among countries to combat global corruption
in a wide variety of criminal settings, including bribery in
international business.32 A recent OECD chart summarizes the
dramatic increase in foreign bribery cases per year based on
international efforts since 1999.33 Beginning with only one case in
1999, the current number of concluded cases per year ranges
between forty to eighty cases since 2008.34 This highlights the
continued widespread prevalence of international bribery and
should be a disturbing statistic, considering the number of cases that
are presumably never brought against international multinational
enterprises that continue to make bribery payments.35
3. THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
NORMS AND MECHANISMS FOR THEIR ENFORCEMENT
The United States paved the way for comprehensive anti-bribery
efforts with the FCPA and advocated for the establishment of
international anti-bribery norms with other nations.36 The OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention was signed in 1997 and entered into force
31 See generally United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-6, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
32 Signature
and
Ratification
Status,
UNODC,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
[https://perma.cc/WEW3-NU9C].
33
OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF
FOREIGN OFFICIALS, supra note 27. See also Roberto A. Ferdman, How the world’s
biggest companies bribe foreign governments—in 11 charts, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/03/how-theworlds-biggest-companies-bribe-foreign-governments-in-11charts/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6ab1039c235f [https://perma.cc/96TR-72GF]
(exploring the spread of bribes between corporations and national governments
and indicating what sort of officials and industries are implicated in bribes).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The
OECD Antibribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012) (discussing the development
of multilateral enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention).
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on February 15, 1999. Currently, there are forty-four countries that
are bound by the Anti-Bribery Convention as signatories, and those
nations are entering Phase 4 of the Convention’s monitoring process
this year.37 Phase 4 review (December 2016–June 2024) continues to
monitor the effectiveness of the national legislative frameworks and
OECD nations’ follow-through on the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention enforcement. This is a regular review procedure by
independent experts, who are not from the nation being reviewed,
and those experts are assigned by the OECD to the peer-review
group for each phase of the OECD monitoring process.38
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention provides a clear structure
for criminalizing and creating liability for bribes flowing to foreign
public officials.39 Articles 1 and 2 clearly denote a criminal offense
of bribery for payments to foreign public officials by legal persons.40
Articles 3 and 4 create criminal and/or non-criminal sanctions for
offenses and national jurisdiction over bribery of foreign officials.41
Furthermore, Articles 5 and 6 of the Anti-Bribery Convention
provide enforcement according to the applicable rules and
principles, and an adequate period for the statutes of limitations to
allow for proper investigation and prosecution.42 Articles 7 and 8 of
the Anti-Bribery Convention denote that money laundering should
be treated in the same way as bribery and the accounting or auditing
standards for financial statements must be regulated in each nation
to facilitate proper corporate recordkeeping.43 Articles 9 and 10
create a basic structure among the OECD nations for mutual legal
assistance and extradition for the offense of bribery.44 Articles 11
37 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/oecdantibriberyconventionentryintoforceoftheconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/WEW3NU9C] (giving the current status and a brief overview of the Convention); see also
Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7 (laying out the
four phases of the Convention’s monitoring process).
38 Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7.
39 See generally OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 16 (establishing liability
for bribes to foreign public officials).
40 Id. at arts. 1 & 2.
41 Id. at arts. 3 & 4.
42 Id. at arts. 5 & 6.
43 Id. at arts. 7 & 8.
44 Id. at arts. 9 & 10.
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and 12 designate the Secretary-General of the OECD as the sole
channel of communication for making and receiving requests and
cooperation among parties for the bribery monitoring and followup inquiries.45 Finally, Articles 13-17 provide treaty procedures for
monitoring the country obligations under the Anti-Bribery
Convention and outline procedures for regular reporting, treaty
signature and accession, and entry into force.46
The Anti-Bribery Convention has a monitoring process with four
phases that has been touted as the “gold standard” of rigorous peerreview monitoring by Transparency International.47 Phase 1 review,
which began in 1999, evaluated the implementing legislation of each
country and the adequacy of national legislation according to OECD
norms.48 Phase 2 review and associated reports assessed the
effectiveness of the application of the national legislation in each
country.49 Currently, most OECD nations have concluded the most
recent Phase 3 review. Phase 3 review focuses on enforcement of the
Anti-Bribery Convention, any outstanding concerns from Phase 2
reports and review, and the 2009 Recommendation for Further
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.50 During the next
year, the Phase 4 reviews of OECD countries will begin. This final
monitoring mechanism will focus on any outstanding issues from
Phase 3 review, continued enforcement, and any cross-cutting issues
that may be tailored to specific country needs.51

Id. at arts. 11 & 12.
Id. at arts. 13–17.
47 Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR FURTHER COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
(Nov. 26, 2009) (outlining further steps for countries to take to combat bribery in
international business transactions).
51 Country monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 7.
45
46
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4. AN ANALYSIS OF OECD ENFORCEMENT AFTER PHASE 3 REVIEW52
The following chart summarizes enforcement efforts by selected
G20 countries that will be discussed in this Article:53
Selected G20 OECD Nations

Enforcement (2015 Comparative Data)54

Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada

No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
Yes – 4 [Sanctions only]

France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Russia
South Korea
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

Yes – 8/5 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
Yes – 68/3 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
Yes – 10/4 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
Yes – 10/2 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
Yes – 16/4 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
No – 0 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
Yes – 10/2 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]
Yes – 67/37 [=Sanctions/Acquittals]

This Section will review the most recent OECD Phase 3 reports
and recommendations and any available follow-up reports
regarding enforcement efforts in selected G20 countries.55
These reports and the above chart reveal that some nations are
complying with anti-bribery enforcement and meeting the
standards of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. However, the
reports also show that some nations are falling short of their
obligations and have significant work to do to appropriately hinder
52
These nations were selected G20 investment statistics from the World Bank
and an equitable selection of countries from each region of the world. See World
Bank, Growth and Development in Emerging Markets and other Developing Countries,
(Nov. 11, 2010) https://www.g24.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Session2_23.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P59-TP2U]; see also World Bank, G20 Financial
Inclusion
Indicators,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=g20-basic-set-offinancial-inclusion-indicators [https://perma.cc/ZJ9R-5S6F].
53 See 2015 DATA ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION, supra
note 27.
54 See id.
55 See Country reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
supra note 7 (providing foreign bribery country reports).
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bribery in the context of international business transactions. The
G20 countries’ enforcement analysis in this Article will fall into three
categories: high enforcement, moderate enforcement, and limited
enforcement. Then, this Section will review possible reasons for lack
of uniformity among OECD nations after review of the Phase 3
reports including: i) effectiveness of the nation’s statute of
limitations; ii) existence of whistleblower protection; iii) analysis of
the domestic implementing legislation and national legal system; iv)
enforcement mechanism(s) or procedure(s) available in the OECD
nation; and v) severity of penalties under the national enforcement
mechanism.
Additional OECD analyses and charts
comprehensively show where bribes have been recently paid during
international business transactions and where bribers are being
punished.56 Some of the nations with the intake of bribes by public
officials, including the United States, Germany, and Korea, are also
the countries with the greatest punishment.57 Conversely, though,
some of the other nations with bribery intake statistics, such as
Russia and selected Asian countries, are not countries with high
enforcement rates.58 A chart from the OECD highlights these
disparities and notes those countries and regions, including Russia,
China, most of Asia, the United States, and portions of South
America, where bribes were most often received by public officials
and paid between 1999-2014.59 This Section will analyze the legal
structures of the enforcement mechanisms in countries with high
enforcement, moderate enforcement, and low enforcement to glean
any obstacles to further international conformity in aligning with the
goals of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

56 See Ferdman, supra note 33 (describing how multinational corporations
bribe foreign governments). See also OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS, supra note 26.
57 See OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF B RIBERY OF
FOREIGN OFFICIALS, supra note 26 (“The United States has sanctioned individuals
and entities for the foreign bribery offence in connection with 128 separate foreign
bribery schemes; Germany has sanctioned individuals and entities for the foreign
bribery offence in connection with 26 separate schemes; Korea in connection with
11 . . . .”).
58 See id. at fig. 19.
59 See id. at fig. 18, 30. See also, Ferdman, supra note 33.
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4.1. Examples of High Enforcement: Germany, Italy, South Korea, and
United States
4.1.1. Germany
Germany’s most recent report is a Phase 3 follow-up report in
April 2013.60 Since the Phase 3 Report, Germany has continued its
sanctioning of large numbers of individuals.61 From March 2011 to
March 2013, thirty-three cases were ended for lack of grounds,
twenty-one resulted in sanctions (after settlement or conviction).62
As of March 2011, out of the sixty-nine persons who have been
sanctioned for foreign bribery, thirty-five were sentenced following
some type of agreement.63 Twenty-one German cases resulted in the
sanctioning of 141 individuals (one case consisted of sixty-one
individuals).64 Out of those, forty-three were for bribery of a foreign
public official, eighty for making commercial bribes, and eighteen
were for “breach of trust and tax evasion.”65 A bill is being discussed
in Germany that could make the sanctions and penalties for foreign
bribery even more serious.66 Germany has held conferences and has
proposed initiatives that have increased awareness of the offense.67
The OECD Working Group stated that more public awareness needs
to be raised in Germany concerning the fact that the criteria or
elements of the offense are to be interpreted broadly, not narrowly.68
The way that facilitation payments should be treated according to
German law is also vague and public education should be
augmented.69 Germany has not introduced any bills with respect to
60 See generally OECD, GERMANY: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 15, 2013) (reporting on the state of foreign bribery in
Germany).
61 See id at 3–4 (summarizing findings).
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id. at 3, 20.
68 See id. at 6–11 (describing recommendations and actions taken to respond to
recommendations).
69 Id.
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whistleblower protection.70 A further report has been requested
from the Working Group.
During Phase 3 and the most recent Phase 4 Report review in
Germany, the OECD Working Group reported that enforcement had
increased since Phase 2 and Germany is the leader of enforcement
in Europe.71 It stated that previous penalties and fines had been
“generally low,” in Germany and that a majority of prison sentences
had been suspended”72 Furthermore, the Working Group found it
to be highly effective that Germany had required its tax auditors to
report suspected instances of bribery.73 In summary, the Working
Group noted that provisions adopting Article 1 of the Anti-Bribery
Convention had not yet been fully integrated by the German
Since Phase 3 review, though, Germany had
legislature.74
investigated a total of 121 cases and forty-seven cases resulted in
sanctions.75
4.1.2. Italy
Italy’s most recent report is a Phase 3 follow-up report in 2014.76
Italy has prosecuted 133 persons, 104 natural persons, and twentynine legal persons since the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention entered

See id. at 22.
See generally OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTIBRIBERY CONVENTION IN GERMANY (Mar. 17, 2011) (reporting on Germany’s progress
in implementing recommendations to improve its foreign bribery enforcement); see
also OECD, PHASE 4 REPORT: GERMANY (June 14, 2018) (evaluating and making
further recommendations regarding Germany’s implementation of foreign bribery
enforcement initiatives); John Bray, Compliance Alert: OECD confirms Germany as
leading
enforcer,
FCPA
Blog,
(July
17,
2018),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/7/17/compliance-alert-oecd-confirmsgermany-as-leading-enforcer.html [https://perma.cc/B6JE-EKC7] (summarizing
Germany’s progress in foreign bribery enforcement and providing
recommendations for future improvement).
72 See PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN GERMANY, supra note 71, at 10.
73 Id. at 22–23.
74 Id. at 30.
75 See PHASE 4 REPORT: GERMANY, supra note 71, at 12.
76 See generally OECD, ITALY: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 20, 2014).
70
71
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into force.77 Of those prosecutions, twelve have been sanctioned
through patteggiamento (“plea bargain”), and seventy-two had their
cases dismissed as time barred.78 The other Italian prosecutions
were acquitted or had their case dismissed for lack of grounds. Since
the Phase 3 report, no new foreign bribery case has been finalized.79
There was a legal person convicted in 2013, but an appeal is pending
on that case.80 Italy implemented, at least partially, a number of
Phase 3 recommendations.81 These include lengthening limitation
periods (“SOLs”) for offenses and protection for whistleblowers.82
The Working Group stated, however, that “the vast majority of the
recommendations remain partially or not implemented.”83 Of the
Phase 3 recommendations, five have been fully implemented, ten
have been partially implemented, and six have not been
implemented at all (twenty-one total).84 There have not been any
steps taken toward making both imprisonment and fines available
to Italian judges.85 There have also been no attempts to increase fines
for violations by legal persons.86 Italy has introduced, though, a new
registry system that was to become operational as of 2014.87 Italy
has undertaken more training for law enforcement personnel and
has taken steps to increase public awareness.88 While public sector
employees have increased whistleblower protection, Italy is only in
the beginning stages of providing such protection to the private
sector to support anti-bribery efforts.89 For export credit and public
Id. at 4–6 (summarizing findings).
Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 4.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 5. See also, Bribery & Corruption: Italy, GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS (2018),
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruptionlaws-and-regulations/Italy [https://perma.cc/FSG7-AF86] (reporting that Italy’s
new compliance procedures within the public administration aim to improve
transparency).
89
ITALY: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
76, at 5.
77
78
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advantages, some steps have been taken by Italy; however, the
OECD Working Group feels that more can and should be done.90 A
further follow up was requested after this most recent report to
address the deficiencies in anti-bribery efforts in Italy.
During Phase 3, the OECD Working Group found that although
sixty defendants had been prosecuted and nine were under
investigation, actual sanctions were only imposed on three
persons.91 Enforcement of foreign bribery laws were found to have
caused internal compliance programs to be formed in Italy.92
Finally, agencies that administer public benefits were also putting
policies in place in order to prevent or detect foreign bribery.93
4.1.3. South Korea
The most recent report on Korea was the Phase 3 follow up in
2014.94
Korea has fully implemented ten recommendations,
partially implemented four, and two recommendations have not
been implemented at all.95 Korea has created a new consultative
body in an attempt to strengthen the country’s information and
Id.
See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN ITALY 5 (Dec. 16, 2011). See also Steven R. Salbu, Transnational
Bribery: The Big Questions, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 435, 445–447 (2001) (noting the
likely chilling effect of sanctions on borderline corrupt behaviors).
92
ITALY: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
76, at 5.
93 PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN
ITALY, supra note 91, at. 5.
94 See generally OECD, KOREA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 8, 2014). See generally, South Korea Corruption Report, BUS.
ANTI-CORRUPTION
PORTAL
(May
2017),
https://www.business-anticorruption.com/country-profiles/south-korea/ [https://perma.cc/A99Y-HX7S]
(listing South Korea’s main legislative frameworks that address corruption); see also
South Korea Fines Prominent Pharmaceutical Manufacturer in Latest Anti-Corruption
&
GRAY
(May
1,
2017),
Enforcement
Efforts,
ROPES
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2017/05/South-Korea-FinesProminent-Pharmaceutical-Manufacturer-in-Latest-Anti-Corruption
[https://perma.cc/FD78-93WH] (reporting that South Korea is increasing its anticorruption enforcement efforts).
95
KOREA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
94, at 4–5 (listing findings).
90
91
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intelligence capability.96 Korea has also ceased destroying records
of foreign bribery every three years, and will now keep them up to
seventy years (and possibly longer).97 The OECD Working Group
suggests that Korea make sure that foreign bribery offenses reach
those from the North Korean regime, or the Kaesong Industrial
Zone.98 Small facilitation payments have been outlawed in South
Korea.99 Penalties that are applied in practice continue to be
“insufficiently effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.”100 There
have been five convictions since the Phase 3 report, and those have
resulted in no jail time and small fines.101 Korea has made attempts
to raise awareness of foreign bribery offenses, but law enforcement
officials need more awareness that legal persons are also subject to
punishment, not solely natural persons.102 The Working Group
states that money laundering recommendations have been partially
implemented, but they worry that large conglomerates will prevent
detection by laundering money.103 Korea has made it mandatory for
auditors to report suspicions of foreign bribery and has afforded
those auditors “due protection” in doing so.104 There have been
around twenty cases of foreign bribery in Korea.105 Upon receiving
referral from foreign authorities, Korean Maritime Police detected
sixteen other cases of foreign bribery. Eleven of those sixteen cases
were dismissed because the payments were classified as small
facilitation payments.106 Overall, since the Phase 3 review, most of
those cases involved the bribery of foreign military staff on Korean
soil.

Id.
Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 4.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 5.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 5.
106 Id. (“In 11 of the 16 cases, the prosecution was suspended because they
concerned small facilitation payments.”). Four natural persons and one legal
person were convicted.
96
97
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4.1.4. United States
The United States has had vigorous prosecutions since the
United States passed implementing legislation to the OECD
Convention in the form of the FCPA.107 The Phase 3 OECD
evaluation report in October 2010 also reveals that the United States
has continued to strongly enforce the FCPA.108 The prosecution of
cases in the United States has steadily increased since the inception
of the FCPA as implementing legislation for the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention.109 Since the Phase 3 report, more than fifteen
individuals were charged and sentenced to imprisonment ranging
from three to fifteen years.110 Criminal fines against corporations
were also imposed in thirty-eight cases, ranging from USD 32,000
to USD 218.8 million.111 The United States has implemented all but
one of the Working Group’s recommendations since the Phase 3
review, which is increasing in the length of the statute of
limitations.112
During the last two years, the SEC recovered almost USD 340
million in thirty-three actions, and the DOJ actions resulted in nearly
USD 750 million in penalties in thirty-one cases.113 Under the
current structure of the statute, the FCPA’s criminal provision and
its statute of limitations is five years.114 This may be extended up to
107 See generally Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance
and Domestic Strategy, 103 VA. L. REV. 1161 (Dec. 2017).
108 See generally OECD, UNITED STATES: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (Dec. 20, 2012).
109 See,
e.g., Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/related-enforcement-actions
[https://perma.cc/3MF9-KQQS]. From 1977 to early 1990s, there were fewer than
twenty enforcement actions. After the 1990s, though, there was a great expansion
in enforcement with some years (e.g., 1999), yielding at least twenty actions per
year. This appears to be slowing down, though, under the Trump administration
with only two enforcement actions pending this year. See Related Enforcement
Actions: 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2018 [https://perma.cc/7VTW-X9PQ].
110
UNITED STATES: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 108, at 3.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 5.
114 Id. at 5–6.
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three years in cases where information is formally sought in a
foreign country.115 Therefore, because most FCPA cases will involve
some foreign evidence, the effective statute of limitations is more
than five years. The DOJ is currently considering further measures
to extend the statute of limitations through legislative action.116
Since the Phase 3 review, the United States has vigorously pursued
violations of the FCPA’s accounting provisions and IRS criminal
investigation special agents have assisted in several criminal
investigations involving violations of the FCPA.117 Overall, the
United States still remains a beacon in anti-bribery prosecution
efforts through its federal statutory structure for criminalizing and
punishing bribery acts and recovering bribes paid under the FCPA.
However, the future of FCPA prosecution and vigilance of antibribery efforts is uncertain under the current Trump
administration.118
4.2. Examples of Moderate Enforcement: Australia, Canada, France,
Japan, and the United Kingdom
4.2.1. Australia
The most recent report filed by Australia is a Phase 3 follow-up
report in 2015.119 In that report, the Working Group found that
Australia had taken many steps to implement the Phase 3
recommendations.120 Of the Phase 3 recommendations, sixteen of
thirty-three have been fully implemented, nine have been partially

Id.
Id. at 6.
117 Id. at 15–18.
118 See, e.g., Jim Zarroli, Trump Used To Disparage An Anti-Bribery Law: Will He
Enforce
It
Now?,
NPR
(Nov.
8,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/08/561059555/trump-used-to-disparage-an-antibribery-law-will-he-enforce-it-now [https://perma.cc/NKK8-CA2P] (describing
President Trump’s reactions to the law).
119 See generally OECD, AUSTRALIA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 3, 2015).
120 Id. at 4–5 (summarizing findings).
115
116
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implemented, and eight have not been implemented at all.121 Since
the Phase 3 report, there have been fifteen bribery allegations in
Australia.122 The number of investigations has gone up from seven
in October 2012 to seventeen at the time of the follow up to Phase
3.123 Australia has taken steps to make the public aware of the
distinction between “facilitation payments” and bribes.124 The
Australian coalition government has established a Fraud and AntiCorruption Centre, located in the Australian Federal Police
Headquarters.125 They have also given presentations to regional
Australian and foreign business communities on the particulars of
the foreign bribery offense in order to increase compliance.126
In Phase 3 review, the Working Group said that Australia’s first
group of bribery prosecutions began in 2011 with charges in the
Securency/NPA case.127 Other than this leading Australian antibribery case, though, they have enforced the foreign bribery laws in
a very limited way.128 Although, the Working Group found that the
lack of enforcement was not due to a lack of allegations. Between
Phases 2 and 3, there were twenty-eight allegations of foreign
bribery; twelve were evaluated, rejected for investigation, and
terminated, and nine were investigated but were closed due to
As of the Phase 3 report, seven
insufficient evidence.129
investigations for bribery were ongoing.130 Two more cases were
closed between Phases 2 and 3.131 Even the major Australian case,
the Securency/NPA case, was “initially rejected after a whistleblower
came forth” and investigation of the case did not occur until after

Id. at 4.
Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 5.
125 Id. at 42–43.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 4.
128 Id. (“Australia still has only 1 prosecution in the Securency/NPA case; this
has been before the courts since prior to Phase 3.”).
129
OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN AUSTRALIA 9 (OCT. 12, 2012).
130 Id.
131 Id.
121
122
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that company self-reported in the following year.132 In summary,
Australia is diligently meeting its international obligations to
prevent bribery in international business under the OECD AntiBribery Convention and has been responsive to recommendations
from OECD representatives during the routine site visits.
4.2.2. Canada
The most recent report on Canada has been a Phase 3 follow
Canada has continued to enforce the anti-bribery laws since
the Phase 3 report was adopted. In that time, two new convictions
have been obtained against oil and gas companies.134 One company
pleaded guilty, was fined CDN 9.5 million, and received three years
of probation.135 The other company self-disclosed and was fined
CDN 10.35 million.136 Two further companies have been indicted in
the technology and construction sectors. Canada has also reported
that there are thirty-five investigations that are ongoing.137 Canada
has amended its laws to clarify ambiguities, as well as to allow for
prosecution of Canadian individuals or companies, wherever the
actual bribery occurs.138 The Working Group added that there are
several areas where “recommendations have not been fully met.”139
up.133

132 Id. at 9. See also, Nick McKenzie & Richard Baker, Guilty Plea, Finally, in
Reserve Bank Bribery Case, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 21, 2018),
https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/guilty-plea-finally-in-reservebank-bribery-case-20180521-p4zgl1.html [https://perma.cc/95UV-Y9ZZ] (“A
former Reserve Bank company executive has pleaded guilty to criminal charges in
one of Australia’s most protracted corruption prosecutions over a payment to a
Malaysian arms dealer to grease the wheels of a business deal.”).
133 See generally OECD, CANADA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 14, 2013). See also, Alan Katz, Foreign Bribery Crackdowns
Haven’t Dented Practice, Report Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-11/foreign-briberyenforcement-hasn-t-dented-practice-report-says [https://perma.cc/5FDW-KGZG]
(describing Canada’s enforcement activities).
134
CANADA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 133 at 3.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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Examples include, “recommendations to enhance audit
requirements” and to develop a desk book to help Canadians
understand the offense.140 Some other recommendations have been
fully implemented, such as making a conviction result in automatic
disbarment from contracting with Canada Public Works and
Government Services Canada, and maintaining resources that are
allocated to investigating claims.141 There are currently charges
pending against three natural persons under the Corruption of
Public Officials Act (CFPOA).142 Penalties can include up to fourteen
years of imprisonment, and there has been “a new books and
records offense” added to the laws that is linked specifically to
foreign bribery.143
During the Phase 3 review in 2011, Canada had one recent
conviction, one ongoing conviction, and over twenty investigations
Overall, Canada is being responsive to its
underway.144
international obligations to combat bribery in international business
during the Phase 3 and Phase 3 follow up review process. However,
the Working Group found that the framework of Canada’s foreign
bribery laws was lacking in four ways: (1) it only applied to bribes
“for profit,” (2) sanctions were often too lenient in practice, (3)
offenses required a real and substantial link to Canada, and (4) the
definitions of the proper factors to consider were vague.145
4.2.3. France
The most recent report on France is the Phase 3 follow-up report
in December 2014.146 Since Phase 3, “France has opened twenty-four
new procedures,” but no legal person has been convicted yet.147
Id.
Id. at 5.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING
CONVENTION IN CANADA 5 (Mar. 18, 2011).
145 Id. at 5–6.
146 See generally OECD, FRANCE: FOLLOW-UP TO
RECOMMENDATIONS (Dec. 19, 2014).
147 Id. at 4.
140
141
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Only three individuals have been convicted in two cases, resulting
in fines ranging from EUR 5,000 to EUR 20,000.148 According to the
follow-up report, acquittals, case closures, and dismissals have risen
from twelve to thirty-one since Phase 3 began.149
Despite the changes in Phase 3, France still needs to implement
more changes to improve its foreign bribery laws. The definition of
“foreign public official” needs clarification in France.150 There has
been no legislative action to repeal the “dual criminality
requirement” for the offense of foreign bribery.151 There are various
case law principles in French law, such as “corruption pact,” that
interfere with enforcement.152 Efforts to train the judiciary on the
enforcement of criminal liability for violations need to be
strengthened.153 The fine for natural persons has been increased to
EUR 1 million, which can be increased to double the proceeds of the
offense, and for legal persons (EUR 5 million) can be increased to ten
times the proceeds.154 Until very recently, there was no proof that
these penalties were being implemented in France.155 Other than
releasing a guide for judges on confiscation, no steps have been
taken to encourage confiscation.156 Prosecution in the wake of victim
complaints is now possible for acts committed entirely or partially
Id.
Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 9.
152 Id. at 10–12.
153 Id. at 4.
154 Id. at 4–5.
155 Id. at 5 (“Notwithstanding, there
exists no sufficiently convincing
practice that would demonstrate that these recommendations are being fully
implemented.”). See Olga Greenberg et al., In a First Coordinated Resolution, US and
French Authorities Announce Agreement to Settle Criminal Charges with Paris-Based
Societe Generale S.A., Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, (June 12, 2018),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=76a4d3f1-98c4-45b2-ab964dd7c64e153e [https://perma.cc/RS6Y-4DQH] (discussing the first coordinated
resolution with international authorities in a bribery case); see also France Suspects
Bribery in Multibillion Dollar Submarine Sale to Brazil, OCCRP (May 22, 2017),
https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/6491-france-suspects-bribery-in-multibilliondollar-submarine-sale-to-brazil-4 [https://perma.cc/RS6Y-4DQH] (discussing the
French investigation of a French industrial company and its payments to Brazilian
authorities).
156
FRANCE: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 146, at 5.
148
149
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in France.157 Also, anti-corruption organizations can file civil party
claims against those who violate foreign bribery laws.158
Interestingly, the public prosecutor’s office can only bring
proceedings for an offense committed abroad if a victim has filed a
prior complaint or there has been an official accusation made by the
country where the offense happened.159 A national prosecutor has
been established to pursue foreign bribery cases. France has refused
to extend its three-year statute of limitations on foreign bribery.160
In the Phase 3 report, it was reported that only thirty-three
proceedings had been initiated in the country, and five convictions
were obtained since France became a party to the OECD Convention
in 2000.161 The Working Group was “particularly concerned by
France’s lackluster response to companies that have been sanctioned
by other parties to the Convention.”162 They commended France for
guaranteeing greater independence for prosecutors, but there were
limited resources that have been made available for
investigations.163 Overall, there were no convictions in France for
bribery of public officials before 2008.164 A month and a half before
the Phase 3 report was adopted, France convicted its first legal
person for bribery.165
4.2.4. Japan
Japan’s most recent report was a Phase 3 follow-up report in
February 2014.166 After Phase 3 was adopted, Japan convicted a
former senior executive of a Japanese company for foreign
Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 6.
161 See generally OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON I MPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTIBRIBERY CONVENTION IN FRANCE 5 (Oct. 12, 2012).
162 Id.
163 Id. (“The Working Group welcomes the reforms underway to guarantee
greater independence of prosecutors . . . ”).
164 Id. at 9
165 Id.
166 See generally OECD, JAPAN: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (Feb. 5, 2014).
157
158
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bribery.167
The individual was fined the equivalent of
approximately USD 5,003.168 The Working Group stated that it
“believe[d] the implementation of the [treaty] is not given adequate
priority by the Japanese, including a lack of resources for detecting,
investigating, and prosecuting foreign bribery cases.”169
As of the Phase 3 follow up, Japan still had not established any
authority for confiscating proceeds of foreign bribery; the country
also had not made bribery a predicate offense for money
laundering.170 The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry plays
a pivotal role in the enforcement of the foreign bribery laws, and the
Working Group is concerned about the suitability of the group for
the job because the information they release is vague or unclear.171
Japan has also not taken steps to ensure that tax inspectors identify
and report potential foreign bribery.172 Japan increased the statute
of limitations for crimes from three to five years, but this limitation
still causes problems with enforcement.173 Japan has taken steps to
allow tax authorities to share tax information with law enforcement
and the judiciary.174
Overall, the recommendations for improving Japan’s auditing
and accounting framework have been fully implemented, and Japan
has been increasing public awareness of the illegality of foreign
bribery.175 Japan has been coordinating efforts to detect, as well as
to prevent, foreign bribery in international business transactions
benefiting from official credit support.176 It has been asked to report
again to the OECD on any improvements next year.

Id. at 4.
Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. See also Japan must make fighting international bribery a priority, OECD
(June 30, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/japan-must-make-fightinginternational-bribery-a-priority.htm [https://perma.cc/V5PL-5S9A] (urging Japan
to strengthen its efforts to fight bribery in foreign business).
173
JAPAN: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
166, at 4–5.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 5.
167
168
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During the Phase 3 report in 2011, Japan was said to have
convicted only two cases since 1999.177 One of those caused four
convictions for natural persons.178 The Working Group urged Japan
to take more steps because two cases in over twelve years is very
low for a major world economy like Japan’s.179
4.2.5. United Kingdom
The most recent report from the United Kingdom was the Phase
3 follow-up report in 2014.180 During the OECD Phase 3 review,
there had been a significant increase in enforcement actions since
Phase 2.181 The working group is concerned that the United
Kingdom is relying more on civil recovery orders, which have less
judicial oversight and are less transparent than criminal plea
agreements.182 This low level of transparency hinders analysis of the
foreign bribery situation in the United Kingdom, and it also does not
increase public awareness of the crime.183 There have also been
confidentiality agreements in some settlements that presented the
same problems.184 In addition, the progress of implementing the
Anti-Bribery Convention in the territories is slow. The United
Kingdom has, however, made attempts to raise awareness of the
offense.185 The United Kingdom maintained eleven active cases and

177 See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN JAPAN 5 (Dec. 16, 2011).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See generally OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT
& RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept. 29, 2014).
181 Id. at 4–6.
182 Id. See also generally Ellen Gutterman, How Policy Framing Shaped UK
Strategy on Transnational Bribery, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. (Mar. 18, 2017),
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/how-policy-framing-shaped-ukstrategy-on-transnational-bribery/[https://perma.cc/7VCE-94YX].
183
UNITED KINGDOM: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 180, at 4–5.
184 Id. at
15 (recommending avoiding entering into confidentiality
agreements).
185
OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 6 (Mar. 16, 2012).
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had eighteen cases under consideration as of January 2012.186 Since
2008, three individuals and two companies have been convicted; in
addition, two financial institutions have been fined for failing to
adopt corporate compliance measures to prevent bribery.187 Finally,
another company has been sanctioned for accounting related
misconduct, and four more businesses have received civil recovery
orders.188
After the Phase 3 follow up, the level of enforcement of serious
offenses has declined.189 In the thirty months before Phase 3, nine
actions relating to foreign bribery were concluded.190 In the twentyseven months after, only two have occurred, one of which resulted
in acquittal.191 The UK Bribery Act, instituted in 2011, has seen no
actions enforced under it, although it provides minimal progress on
its own.192 The enforcement budget has stayed the same, but
“blockbuster funding” is available in special or serious bribery
cases.193 A self-report now deflects prosecution if it “is part of a
genuinely proactive approach” by the offender.194 The timing of the
self-report is a key consideration. During a settlement, if the settling
party is found not to have disclosed further offenses, they may still
be prosecuted for those offenses; such agreements do not give
blanket immunity to further prosecution.195 Deferred prosecution
agreements have come into use in the United Kingdom.196 The
United Kingdom has taken no steps since Phase 3 review to make
Article 5 of the Anti-Bribery Convention clearly binding.197 A new

186
187
188

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
UNITED

189
KINGDOM: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 183, at 4.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. See also, generally Eric Engle, I Get by with a Little Help from My Friends?
Understanding the UK Anti-Bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention, and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 INT’L LAW 1173 (2010).
193
UNITED KINGDOM: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 183, at 4.
194 Id. (citation omitted).
195 Id. at 5.
196 Id.
197 Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

494

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:2

database is being developed for MLA (“Mutual Legal Assistance”)
statistics.198 Interestingly, the concept of “facilitation payments” is
not recognized under UK law.199 There has been no change in export
credit practice, and the United Kingdom states that it reviews tax
records of defendants in foreign bribery cases, but there is no
evidence of this being done in practice.200
During its recent Phase 4 report, the peer reviewers noted that
the United Kingdom has concluded nine cases involving criminal
liability and has increased enforcement.201 Since the OECD
convention entered into force in 1999 until 2016, there have been
over 100 allegations of foreign bribery and fifty case investigations
with thirteen cases of criminal liability.202 In the United Kingdom,
whistleblower protection is ensured under the UK’s Public Interest
Disclosure Act of 1998 (PIDA), which protects employees after
disclosing misconduct, including foreign bribery.203 The penalties
for concluded cases in the United Kingdom include sentences
ranging from suspended terms of imprisonment to three years of
imprisonment.204 In all five criminal cases against legal persons after
Phase 3, the gross profit from the misconduct has been assessed and
confiscated in addition to punitive or remedial sanctions.205 Overall,
the United Kingdom has demonstrated good practices with
confiscation in foreign bribery cases since Phase 3.206

Id.
Id. at 6.
200 Id.
201 See OECD, PHASE 4 REPORT: UNITED KINGDOM 11 (Mar. 16, 2017) (“As of
January 2017, the UK had concluded 9 additional cases involving criminal liability
of 10 natural persons and 6 legal persons.”).
202 Id. at 14.
203 See id. at 18 (demonstrating how the PIDA covers most UK workers, except
those working in armed forces and national security, and defines wrongdoing
broadly. The workers in the UK do not need to qualify for the offense and do not
have to prove wrongdoing, but PIDA does not protect a whistleblower from
retaliation before it occurs. Instead the statute relies on compensation after the fact.
PIDA also contains no direct civil or criminal penalties to stop, prevent, or
discourage bullying or harassment of the whistleblower.)
204 Id. at 12.
205 Id. at 63.
206 Id. at 63–64.
198
199
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4.3. Countries with Limited Enforcement: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Russia, and Turkey
4.3.1. Argentina
The Working Group said in their Phase 3 report that Argentina
is “seriously non-compliant” with the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention obligations after reviewing information from the June
2014 on-site visit.207
Argentina has not implemented prior
recommendations calling for the introduction of corporate liability
for foreign bribery, has not passed laws that give national
jurisdiction to prosecute violations, and has also failed to rectify
several shortcomings with respect to its foreign bribery offense
scheme.208 However, there have been some efforts by Argentina to
improve the situation and to create structures to prevent bribery in
the context of business and procurement of contracts.209 Argentina
must next make a 3bis report to the Working Group due to
substantial non-compliance.210 Argentina became a party to the
Anti-Bribery Convention in 2001, and there have been ten
allegations of foreign bribery since then.211 Three of those are
currently under investigation as of the Phase 3 report.212 Two of
them closed without any charges. One case did not have an
investigation due to a lack of information. Another turned out to
involve other offenses, not foreign bribery. There have been two
allegations of potential foreign bribery after the on-site visit of the
Working Group, but they are so far unofficial and unconfirmed.213
Finally, the tenth allegation surfaced ten days before the Phase 3
report was published. Argentina has not passed laws giving it the
ability to impose sanctions against “legal person” for foreign bribery
as of the Phase 3 report, so the Committee required follow-up
207 See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING
CONVENTION IN ARGENTINA 5 (Dec. 11, 2014).
208 Id. at 13–16, 60–65.
209 Id. at 61.
210 Id. at 5.
211 Id. at 8.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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reports by the end of 2016.214 Argentina has extradition treaties with
fourteen countries, including eleven members of the Working
Group.215 For progress towards raising awareness of the crime and
anti-bribery efforts, the Working Group in Phase 3 said that
Argentina has taken only “limited steps.”216 In summary, according
to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and based on the recent
comprehensive Phase 3 report and findings, Argentina is falling
behind on its international obligations to combat bribery.
During the on-site visit in 2014, the Working Group found that
prosecutors and investigative judges in charge of the foreign bribery
cases did not attend the on-site visits.217 Their absence seriously
undermined the effectiveness of the visit and precluded a full
assessment of Argentina’s enforcements efforts in practice.218 The
peer-review Working Group concluded that Argentina remains in
serious non-compliance with key articles of the Anti-Bribery
Convention.219 The corporate liability bill did not enter into force in
Argentina and efforts to draft a revision to the Argentinian penal
code were also abandoned since the Phase 3 review.220 There have
only been thirteen known foreign bribery allegations involving
Argentine companies and individuals, and eight allegations are still
under investigation.221 Argentina has not enacted a specific law on
whistleblowing, and the report expressed serious concerns about the
lack of proactive investigations for foreign bribery allegations or
seeking the cooperation of foreign authorities.222 Under current
Argentinian law, money laundering offenses are punishable by
imprisonment of six months to three years, bribery and improper
lobbying are punished with imprisonment of one to six years and
perpetual disqualification, and foreign bribery is punished with

Id. at 17–19.
Id. at 55.
216 Id. at 57.
217 Id. at 7.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 19.
220 Id. at 17–18.
221
OECD, PHASE 3BIS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING
CONVENTION IN ARGENTINA 8 (MARCH 2017).
222 Id. at 59–60.
214
215
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reclusion (imprisonment) from one to six years and special
disqualification for life for any public office.223
4.3.2. Brazil
Brazil’s most recent report has been its Phase 3 follow-up report
in February 2017.224 This report reveals substantial progress in
Brazil although they are still substantially behind countries with
high or moderate enforcement. Based on the thirty-nine Phase 3
recommendations from 2014, eighteen recommendations have been
fully implemented, thirteen partially implemented, and eight are
not yet implemented.225 Overall, this shows positive progress to
combat bribery from Brazil in international business dealings.
The Phase 3 Working Group congratulated Brazil for
implementing a new corporate liability law.226 The country also
indicted nine individuals as a result of a single case of foreign
bribery.227 Despite this progress, though, the OECD Working Group
remains concerned about enforcement on anti-bribery norms in
Brazil.228 In the fourteen years since Brazil became a party to the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, only five cases have been
brought.229 Of those five cases, only three are ongoing (and two are

223 Id. at 76. See also generally Kim Nemirow, et. al., A Look at Argentina’s New
Anti-Corruption
Law,
Law360
(Nov.
21,
2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/987246/a-look-at-argentina-s-new-anticorruption-law [https://perma.cc/HR2Q-6FVE] .
224 See generally OECD, BRAZIL: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (Feb. 10, 2017).
225 Id. at 6. See also generally Linda Pressly, The Largest Foreign Bribery Case in
History, BBC (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43825294,
[https://perma.cc/UX5V-HCX4]; Joe Leahy, A Brazilian Bribery Machine, FIN. TIMES
(Dec.
28,
2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/8edf5b2c-c868-11e6-90437e34c07b46ef [https://perma.cc/Y3MX-3Q86].
226 See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN BRAZIL 6 (Oct. 16, 2014). See also generally Michelle Richard, Brazil’s
Landmark Anti-Corruption Law, 20 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 141 (2014).
227
PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN
BRAZIL, supra note 226, at 5.
228 Id. at 5.
229 Id.
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“far from reaching the prosecutorial stage”).230 A possible obstacle
for enforcement in Brazil may be a statute of limitations which can
result in lightly sentenced cases being dismissed, as well as a lack of
protection for whistleblowers.231 The group suggests that Brazil
needs to train law enforcement on how to investigate foreign bribery
properly, as well as how to freeze and/or confiscate assets.232 They
could also implement leniency or cooperation agreements to entice
offenders to self-report.233 The enforcement against false accounting
practices meant to hide foreign bribery also needs to be
strengthened.234 Brazil has made some efforts to increase awareness
about corporate fraud.235
For the foreign bribery offense,
individuals can receive one to eight years of imprisonment.236 Also,
fines between the equivalent of EUR eighty and EUR 428,000 can be
added alongside, but not instead of, jail time.237 Fines can also be
increased up to threefold if Brazilian authorities find that the
maximum fine is inadequate. Brazilian law currently provides a fine
reduction for cooperating with authorities.238
4.3.3. Mexico
Mexico’s most recent report is the Phase 3 follow-up report in
2014.239 Mexico has implemented four recommendations fully, ten
partially, and eight recommendations were not implemented at all
from the Phase 3 review.240 Mexico still has zero prosecutions or
Id.
Id. at 45–63.
232 Id. at 5.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 18–20.
236 Id. at 23.
237 Id at 23.
238 See generally Joan Meyer & Fernando Correa da Costa, U.S.-Brazil Alignment
Is Incentivizing Companies to Settle Corruption Cases, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Aug.
30, 2017, https://globalcompliancenews.com/us-brazil-alignment-corruptioncases-20170830/ [https://perma.cc/D92K-5R3J].
239 See generally OECD, MEXICO: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (June 16, 2014).
240 Id. at 3.
230
231
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convictions for foreign bribery.241 A single investigation began in
2014 and is still ongoing.242 There have been no laws adopted with
respect to confiscation of the proceeds from foreign bribery, but
Mexico claims that it can enforce it nonetheless.243 A “Special
Prosecutor’s Office for the Combat against Corruption” has been
established, but Mexico will not supply any information as to its
financial or human resources.244 Mexican authorities have used
“special investigative techniques,” such as wiretapping and
undercover operations, when investigating foreign bribes.245
Mexico also has supplied insufficient statistics on domestic
bribery.246 No additions to auditing or corporate compliance have
been made since the Phase 3 OECD Report.247 The Mexican Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and ProMéxico have engaged in awarenessraising in Mexico.248 However, no information has been supplied by
Mexico with regard to disbarment from public procurement as a
potential punishment for violators of the country’s labor laws.249
4.3.4. Russia
Russia’s most recent report is a Phase 2 follow-up report in
2016.250 In the report, Russia did not provide a complete report of
activities, only fifteen of the Working Group’s Phase 1
Id.
Id.
243 Id. at 4.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246
OECD, MEXICO: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 239, at 5.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See generally OECD, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 2
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 9, 2016). See also generally Russia must make
fighting
international
bribery
a
priority,
OECD
(Oct.
25,
2017),
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/russia-must-make-fighting-internationalbribery-a-priority.htm [https://perma.cc/ZCU2-F4KT] (reporting that the OECD
Working Group has serious concerns regarding “Russia’s continued failure to
implement key legislative reforms to enable it to effectively investigate, prosecute,
and sanction the offence of foreign bribery”).
241
242
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recommendations were addressed.251 Russia has implemented ten
recommendations, twenty-one have been partially implemented,
Four
and nineteen have not been implemented at all.252
recommendations by the OECD were considered implemented, but
later had follow up issues.253 Russia has not detected, prosecuted,
or adjudicated any cases of foreign bribery.254 However, there are
some efforts to raise awareness of the offense in Russia.255 The
systems in place to detect bribery and similar offenses focus on
domestic offenses, not foreign or international ones.256 Russia has
indicated that it is in the process of drafting whistleblower laws.257
Russia has taken steps to ensure that those who request export credit
assistance are aware of the offense of foreign bribery.258 The
Working Group says that Russia should focus its efforts around the
arms and military because these areas are particularly sensitive to
bribery.259 Furthermore, Russia has “promoted its anti-corruption
charter,” but there is only a single sentence that addresses internal
controls and it gives no guidance.260 Russia has monitored the
actions of law enforcement through the opening and closing of
investigations, including foreign bribery.261 The country has an
affirmative defense of “effective regret,” as well as one of “economic
extortion” that can hinder prosecution of bribery.262 The Working
Group suggests that Russia should take measures to punish those
who do not complete a bribe, but have offered, or promised, to do
so in order to better align with international standards under the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.263 In addition, Russia has not taken

251
OECD, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: FOLLOW-UP
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 250, at 4.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 4–5.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 5.
261 Id. at 7.
262 Id. (citation omitted).
263 Id. at 8.
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any actions to allow confiscation of bribery proceeds.264 Overall, the
OECD Working Group requires that Russia continues follow-up
reports every six months, detailing the steps they are taking to
further compliance of national implementation procedures to
prevent bribery.265
4.3.5. Turkey
The most recent Turkish report was the Phase 3 Report in 2014.266
There has not been a single foreign bribery conviction during the
eleven years since Turkey joined the Convention.267 Ten allegations
have come to light since 2003.268 Turkish authorities have taken
limited steps in six of those allegations, there has been one acquittal,
and two are ongoing due to mutual legal assistance requests.269
Three allegations were terminated for insufficient evidence.270 There
have been no steps taken in two of the cases, and Turkey was
unaware of two instances, despite them being in the international
press.271 Turkey has also had no enforcement against legal persons
for bribery.272 Turkey’s corporate liability laws may further not
cover state-owned enterprises.273 The Working Group is concerned
that investigations and prosecutions may be subject to undue
Id.
Id. at 10.
266 See generally OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON I MPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTIBRIBERY CONVENTION IN TURKEY (Oct. 17, 2014) (reporting on the implementation of
Turkey’s anti-bribery initiatives). See also Ali Guden, Looking at Anti-Bribery
Legislation in Turkey and Beyond, GUDEN L. FIRM (Aug. 2015),
http://guden.av.tr/looking-anti-bribery-legislation-turkeybeyond/[https://perma.cc/E6EK-4EQN] (summarizing the state of Turkey’s antibribery environment).
267
PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN
TURKEY, supra note 266, at 5.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 See OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN TURKEY 4 (Oct. 17, 2014).
273
PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN
TURKEY, supra note 272, at 5.
264
265
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political influence.274 There is insufficient whistleblower protection
in both the public and private sectors in Turkey.275 More specific
awareness for bribery and anti-bribery efforts is needed in Turkey
to inform businesses about the offense.276 Overall, there have been
minimal legislative efforts to strengthen the punishments for the
offense of foreign bribery, and certain steps have been taken to bar
those convicted from public tender participation in Turkey.277
Turkey’s follow-up to the Phase 3 report demonstrates limited
progress.278 Of the two investigations that had been underway at
the time of Phase 3, one had not progressed and the other appeared
to have been closed.279 The Working Group had continued concerns
about lack of enforcement and lack of proactive steps by Turkey’s
law enforcement authorities or international cooperation through
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.280 Further, Turkey has not amended
its laws or taken any other measures to clarify that all Turkish legal
persons can be held liable for foreign bribery or that legal persons
can be held liable without prosecution of a natural person.281
Additionally, Turkey has not increased sanctions applicable to legal
persons or ensured confiscation of bribe proceeds in accordance
with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s standards.282 Turkish
legislation has not been amended to include the protection of
whistleblowers, but Turkey has raised some awareness of the need
to detect and report allegations of foreign bribery.283 Turkey has
taken some steps to improve detection of foreign bribery in money
laundering cases; however, Turkey has not addressed the issue of
politically exposed persons in its anti-money-laundering

Id.
Id.
276 Id.
277
PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN
TURKEY, supra note 272, at 6.
278 See generally OECD, TURKEY: FOLLOW-UP TO PHASE 3 REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 31, 2017) (reporting on Turkey’s progress in
implementing anti-bribery mechanisms).
279 Id. at 4.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 5.
282 Id.
283 Id.
274
275
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legislation.284 As a result, the follow-up report still had serious
concerns about the lack of enforcement activity and slow progress
in Turkey with regard to many of the Working Group’s Phase 3
recommendations.285
5. OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE LACK OF ADEQUATE ANTIBRIBERY ENFORCEMENT DEMONSTRATED IN THE RECENT OECD
PHASE 3 AND FOLLOW UP REPORTS
The persistent lack of adequate anti-bribery enforcement, which
still persists in G20 nations after the formal adoption of the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention by the international community over
twenty years ago, is disturbing.286 The United States continues to be
a beacon in anti-bribery enforcement measures and has the most
sophisticated implementing legislation through the passage of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and later amendments to the Act that
implemented the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.287
After
reviewing the most recent peer-review Working Group reports and
recommendations for the selected G20 countries with high,
moderate, and limited enforcement, certain themes challenging lack
of enforcement may be gleaned from recurring issues. These
include: (1) inadequate length of statute of limitations in certain
countries according to the national implementing legislation; (2)
lack of whistleblower protection or delayed whistleblower
protection that renders it ineffective; (3) nonexistent or weak
implementing legislation for national anti-bribery laws; (4) minimal
coordination of anti-bribery efforts with national Ministries of
Foreign Affairs or national agencies that would assist with
combatting bribery; and (5) weak national criminal penalties or
monetary damages for bribery. The following recommendations
would strengthen national anti-bribery efforts for countries with
currently moderate or limited enforcement measure to better align
with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s goals.

Id.
Id. at 6.
286 See supra Sections 2 & 3.
287 See supra Section 2. See also generally International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, supra note 6.
284
285
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5.1. Increased Length of Statute of Limitations
According to numerous reports of the Working Groups and
analysis of countries with moderate or minimal success with antibribery efforts, the length of the statute of limitations is an issue with
enforcement. Countries with very short statutes of limitation (one
to three years) have trouble enforcing the national legislation and
seeking out offenders who violate the anti-bribery provisions
because it is difficult to coordinate with foreign officials during a
short time period.288 The ideal length of time for a national statute
of limitations in conjunction with a foreign anti-bribery statute
would be greater than five years. This would allow enough time to
coordinate the action and provide mutual legal assistance to the
additional foreign countries and their associated foreign ministries
for appropriate prosecution of the action within the home country.289
Overall, a statute of limitations of at least five years would be more
similar to the U.S.’s standard in the FCPA and would provide time
for better enforcement actions in OECD implementation nations.
For nations that do not currently have a statute of limitations in
place, they would need to integrate an appropriate statute of
limitations into their implementing anti-bribery legislation.
5.2. Existence of Whistleblower Protection in Statutes
The Phase 3 Working Group reports, recommendations, and
follow-up Phase 3 critiques for nations with moderate or limited
enforcement also highlight the importance of whistleblower
protections. Many instances of bribery in G20 nations are not
investigated because interested parties do not have adequate
whistleblower protection via national laws or have inadequate
protection after bringing forward claims of bribery.290 Thus,
inclusion of specific whistleblower protection in either the criminal
statutory provisions or civil penalty provisions of anti-bribery
legislation would be a protective measure that would facilitate
successful prosecution.291
Accordingly, anti-bribery statistics
288
289
290
291

See, e.g., supra Section 4.2. & 4.3.
See generally supra Section 4.
See supra Section 4.2. & 4.3.
See generally supra Section 4.
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regarding national enforcement and confiscating bribery funds
would likely improve with the integration of uniform whistleblower
protections into national implementation legislation.
5.3. Formal Adoptions of Implementing Legislation and National AntiBribery Laws
The Working Group reports also revealed that countries with
detailed implementing legislation for anti-bribery, such as the U.S.’s
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the UK’s Anti-Bribery Act, have
more successful outcomes for bribery prosecution and penalties.292
The recommendations noted that some of the moderate and limited
enforcement G20 nations still had yet to promulgate national antibribery legislation to effectuate the terms of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, and this has stalled efforts for those countries to
prosecute bribery claims.293 Nations that are a party to the OECD
Convention have an obligation to pass implementing legislation
according to the preliminary articles of the Anti-Bribery
Convention.294 Numerous nations in the international community
are still falling short of their basic treaty obligations because they
have not passed implementing civil or criminal national legislation
to outline terms to combat foreign bribery in international business
transactions.295 The Working Group’s most recent Phase 3 reports
and follow-up reports have urged those nations without statutory
structures for anti-bribery to quickly pass appropriate legislation or
integrate foreign anti-bribery norms into existing legislation.296
5.4. Clarity of Enforcement Mechanism(s) and National Procedure
The recommendations of the most recent Working Groups also
illuminate the nonexistence or weakness of national administrative
292
293
294
295
296

See generally supra Section 3 & 4.
See supra Sections 4.2. & 4.3.
See supra Section 3.
See generally supra Section 4.
Id.
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structures for prosecuting acts of foreign bribery.297 Many of the
countries with statistics of limited enforcement, such as Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, or Russia, have a clear lack of infrastructure for
coordinating prosecutions and extraditions with the appropriate
Ministries of Foreign Affairs or internal agencies to coordinate
prosecution of foreign bribery.298 There should be examination of
the infrastructures and agencies within those nations to encourage
enforcement and coordination with internal departments for better
anti-bribery efforts.299 Furthermore, the designated agencies should
be proactive with their internal investigations and work with other
nations’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs to facilitate mutual legal
assistance and penalties for international bribery according to the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s guidelines.300
Finally,
coordination of administrative bodies in conjunction with a national
implementing Act, such as the U.S. structure of the FCPA and the
DOJ/SEC, is a much more successful model and encompasses the
requirements of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
5.5. Equality in Severity of National Penalties
According to the most recent Working Group recommendations
and Phase 3 reports, many nations are giving drastically different
penalties for foreign bribery.301 The low penalties then do not deter
the criminal actors in the international community and render the
implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention as an ineffective
device to combat bribery in those nations with moderate or limited
enforcement.302 Some countries have very low fines or amounts of
monetary penalties, such as Russia or Turkey, when juxtaposed to
recovery of amounts confiscated in the United States, Germany, and
Italy.303 In addition, penalties of imprisonment were vastly different
See supra Sections 4.2. & 4.3.
Id. See also OECD, TYPOLOGY ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
BRIBERY CASES 25–45 (Dec. 7, 2012).
299 See supra Sections 4.2. & 4.3.
300 Id. See also supra Sections 3 & 4.
301 See supra Section 4.
302 Id.
303 See supra Section 4.1.
297
298
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with little or no imprisonment in some countries and lengthy
sentences of incarceration in other OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
countries.304 Efforts toward uniformity in recovery of foreign bribes
in the international community and incorporation of penal
provisions within the national implementing legislation should be
made to better strengthen enforcement and even out the severity in
penalties to align with the Anti-Bribery Convention’s terms.305
6. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS UNIFORMITY WITH FCPA-MODELED
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION AS A MODEL FOR OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION NORMS AND ENFORCEMENT
Fighting foreign bribery on a global scale is a continued
challenge even with the strides made through the OECD’s AntiBribery Convention for International Business Transactions and its
national implementation in many countries. However, the United
States currently serves as a beacon of enforcement and provides a
successful structure for implementing act through the FCPA and
administrative agency structures for legitimizing enforcement.306
The future vigorous enforcement in the United States remains
uncertain, however, with the Trump administration and
restructuring of leadership in administrative agencies that combat
bribery.307 This Article should point the way toward improving
Id. See generally supra Section 4.
See generally supra Sections 3 & 4.
306 See supra Sections 2 & 4.
307 See, e.g., John Bowden, U.S. Backs Out of Global Oil Anti-Corruption Effort,
THE HILL (Nov. 2, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/international/358560-usbacks-out-of-global-oil-anti-corruption-effort
[https://perma.cc/J8YD-6R4B]
(discussing U.S. withdrawal from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
which requires member states to disclose oil, gas, and mining revenues); Steve Coll,
The Trump Administration Rolls Back Anti-Corruption Efforts in the Oil Industry, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/thetrump-administration-rolls-back-anti-corruption-efforts-in-the-oil-industry
[https://perma.cc/7HC8-3HFK] (reviewing the Trump Administration’s
rescinding and withdrawal from pro-transparency oil policies); see also, Scott L.
Fredericksen et al., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New Trump
Administration: Your Top Ten Questions Answered, FOLEY & LARDNER (May 10, 2017),
https://www.foley.com/the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-and-the-new-trumpadministration-your-top-ten-questions-answered-05-102017/[https://perma.cc/5JVX-HGJ] (discussing possible changes in President
304
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uniformity in combatting international bribery, though, through the
continued use of Phase 3 reports and peer-review recommendations
as takeaways for guidance. The parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention should continue to heed harsh feedback, and the
nations need to take the observations seriously to effectuate
prosecution and coordination of mutual assistance efforts to further
legitimize foreign anti-bribery initiatives. The United States
provides a model for implementing legislation through the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and current administrative coordination via
the DOJ and SEC. The OECD peer-review reports note the need for
increased statute of limitations, formal protection of whistleblowers,
clear enforcement mechanisms, facilitating passage of national
legislation or addition to pre-existing legislation to incorporate the
terms of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and uniformity in the
severity of national penalties to deter bribery and confiscate funds.
There may still be some disparities in implementation of the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention terms after the most recent peer-review
reports; however, the United States may provide a successful model
for effective administrative structures, statutory provisions, and
coordination with foreign governments for optimal anti-bribery
efforts to align with the spirit of the Anti-Bribery Convention for
future success.
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